Tejel: Nuances are needed in understanding Christian-Kurdish relations in Syria

Additional comment from Research Professor Jordi Tejel for my piece about relations between Christians and Kurds in Northeastern Syria. He works at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva) and is author of many articles on the Kurds in Syria and of Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society (2009). His comment is important to understand the historical relations between Christians and Kurds in Syria, and in other parts of the Middle-East.



Jordi Tell:

Yes, the author of the cable got the sense of relations in Jazira, although a nuance is needed. "Kurds" and "Christians" are categories that must be challenged and we need to go back to the interwar era and the French Mandatory period in Syria, even back to the First World War. As you know during the First World War Kurds massacred many Christian in Eastern Anatolia, mainly Armenians but also Syriacs. At the same time, some Kurdish notables and tribal leaders concluded alliances with Christian population in a region ranging from Mardin to Tur Abdin and indeed many Christians (Armenians, Catholic Assyrians,...) did survive.

When the French occupied Syria, they welcomed Christian and Kurdish refugees from Turkey. In exchange, newcomers had to be loyal to the French and develop economically the Jazira. The trouble was that French policies in the region divided up local populations. Generally speaking, Catholic Christians (Assyrians and Armenians alike) had better relations both with the French and Kurds, whereas Orthodox Christians (Syriacs and Armenians alike) preferred to establish good relations with the local Arabs and the Arab government in Damascus. During the 1930s, some conflicts emerged and some Syriac Christians (in Amude) were killed by Kurdish tribesmen. In Qamishli and Hasake. Some Kurdish leaders wished to establish an autonomous entity within the Syrian state, others worked for the establishment of a Kurdish state along with Eastern Anatolia or today's Iraqi Kurdistan. In that sense, some Christians and Arabs alike feared that Kurds in Jazira sought to "Kurdizise" the region and therefore become the sole elites.

When the French left, Arabs and Christians marginalized Kurdish elites in the region. They shared the economic and political power of Jazira. Throughout the Baath rule, this did not change and while the regime co-opted individuals from every community, many Orthodox Syriacs joined the local mukhabarat. In so doing, they especially repressed Catholic Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds and ultimately favored the cooperation among the latter.

Things worsened in 2004, after the Kurdish uprising in Qamishli, since Christians realized that they were losing social, cultural, and economic distinction and elite status in local affairs. The revolt resulted in significant feelings of insecurity among the Christians in general, they feared new massacres against them and the raising of a "Kurdish power" in the region. As for Arabs, some Kurdish tribes and Arab tribes have been fighting for land properties since the French Mandate... And relations between Kurds and Arabs from Der ez-Zor were particularly bad since many Arabs from that town worked for the pro-government militias which were due to control the Jazira.

Yet relations between Kurdish and Christian intellectuals continue and they are especially good in Qamishli.

As for the Syrian opposition, well it's true that this historical background makes things more complicated, but again it depends on what Kurds and Christians we are talking about. Armenian, Assyrian and Kurdish political parties have some elements in common: they don't want a religious government in Damascus, that's something to start with.